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II. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Sam H. Bennion's (" Bennion" ) Petition is occasioned by an 
Order of the Utah Board of Oil, Gas and Mining (the "Board") and, 
therefore, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(c)(IV) and Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46(b)-16, the Utah Supreme Court has exclusive 
jurisdiction of the matter. 
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
(A) Did the Board properly interpret and apply § 40-6-9 and 
§ 40-6-6 of the Utah Code Annotated in determining that a forced 
pooling order was necessary before the Board could order the 
requested accounting and make any of the other awards requested 
by Bennion. 
(B) Did the Board, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46B-
1(4)(b) and Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
properly dismiss Bennion' s Request for Agency action. 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Review of Board Determinations of Facts. 
Petitioner (hereinafter "Bennion") is not entitled to relief 
from the Court unless he has been substantially prejudiced by an 
agency action "based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the 
-1-
g:\wpn\110\00000z0f.W51 
court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1989) "Substantial 
evidence" is such "relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. " Grace Drilling 
Company v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 
776 P. 2d 63. 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). This is not de novo review 
nor a complete evidentiary review. I&. The Court must review 
the Board' s decision by examining both the supporting evidence 
and that which fairly detracts from those findings. Bennion, in 
challenging the Board' s findings of fact, must marshall all 
evidence supporting the agency' s decision and demonstrate that 
despite these supporting facts, the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence in light of the conflicting and 
contradicting evidence. First National Bank of Boston v. County 
Board of Equalization of Salt Lake county, 799 P. 2d 1163 (Ut. 
1990) 
2. Review of Agency Determinations of Legal Issues. 
Bennion is not entitled to relief unless he can demonstrate 
that he has been substantially prejudiced by an erroneous 
interpretation of the law. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) 
(1989) The determination of applicable law is subject to the 
"correction of error" standard. Olympus Oil Inc. v. Harrison. 
778 P. 2d 1008 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
-2-
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3. Review of Board1 s Application of Law to Fact. 
Bennion is not entitled to relief unless he can demonstrate 
that he has been substantially prejudiced by an unreasonable or 
irrational application of law. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) 
(1989). Review of the Board's application of law to facts and 
mixed questions of law and fact is governed by the 
"reasonableness and rationality" standard requiring that the 
Board's decision not exceed "the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality." Pearl-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review of this 
Industrial Commission of Utah. 775 P. 2d 439 (Utah Ct. App, 1989); 
Johnson yt Pepartment of Employment ?ecmritv, 782 p. 2d 965 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). 
IV. DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The case involves interpretations of provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 40-6-6 and § 40-6-9, both of which are reprinted in the 
Addendum to this Brief. 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves judicial construction of the accounting 
provisions of Utah' s forced pooling statute found within the Utah 
Oil and Gas Conservation Act. Bennion is appealing from an Order 
of the Board dated June 24, 1991 (Addendum "A"). The Board's 
-3-
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Order was entered in response to a Motion to Dismiss or in the 
alternative a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Graham on 
September 10, 1990. (Addendum "B"). Bennion had previously 
filed a Request for Agency Action seeking, among other things, an 
order for an accounting for two oil and gas wells both of which 
are operated by Graham. 
Graham asserted in its Motion that it was impossible to 
provide Bennion with an accounting or proceeds based thereon 
until a Forced Pooling Order has been entered. Such an Order 
would serve to determine what Mr. Bennion' s mineral interests 
were in the subject wells and lands and the nonconsent penalty to 
be charged against that interest. The Board, after receiving 
arguments and memorandum concerning Graham' s Motion granted 
Graham' s Motion and dismissed Mr. Bennion' s Petition for Agency 
Action. 
B. COURSE OP PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
There is little or no dispute as to the procedural history 
of this case and the course of proceedings for this case are set 
forth in subsection A above and subsection C below. 
C. STATEMENT OP RELEVANT FACTS 
Mr. Bennion owns an undivided mineral interest in the north 
half of Section 20, Township 3 South, Range 5 West, U. S. M. , in 
Duchesne County, Utah. (Affidavit of William J. Dwyer, at 116). 
Bennion owns no mineral interest in the south half of Section 20, 
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Township 3 South, Range 5 West, U. S. M. , Duchesne County, Utah. 
(Affidavit of William J. Dwyer, at 116). By Order of the Board 
dated September 20, 1972, in Cause No. 139-8, a drilling unit was 
established for common development of the entire 640 acres 
comprising Section 20 as to the stratigraphic interval generally 
defined as being from the top of the Lower Green River formation 
to the base of the Green River-Wasatch formation (Affidavit of 
William J. Dwyer, at 117). One well was authorized in the 
drilling unit comprising Section 20, with the permitted location 
in the center of the north half of the said Section 20. 
(Affidavit of William J. Dwyer, at U7). On or about April 18, 
1973, the Texaco-Gulf-Jensen-Fenzl #1 Well was completed in the 
north of Section 20 and commenced production. This well has 
produced sporadically since first production. (Affidavit of 
William J. Dwyer, at 1F8). This well did not produce during the 
period 1982 through April 1985. (Affidavit of William J. Dwyer, 
at 1F8). The Page #2-20C5 Well was drilled as a substitute well 
in the NE%SW% of Section 20 and commenced production on or about 
February 11, 1981. (Affidavit of William J. Dwyer, at 119). That 
well has produced continuously since first production. 
(Affidavit of William J. Dwyer, at H9). 
Graham Energy, Ltd. assumed operations for both the Jensen-
Fenzl #1 and Page #2-20C5 Wells in April of 1984. (Affidavit of 
William J. Dwyer, at 1F10). Effective July 1, 1984, Graham 
Energy, Ltd. , acquired the interest of Page Petroleum, Inc. in 
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the subject lands and wells (Affidavit of William J. Dwyer, at 
1F10). By Order dated April 17, 1985, in Cause No. 139-42, the 
Board authorized the drilling and production of a second well in 
the drilling unit for Section 20. (Affidavit of William J. 
Dwyer, at 1111). The Order authorized the simultaneous production 
of both the Jensen-Fenzl #1 and the Page #2-20C5 wells. 
(Affidavit of William J. Dwyer, at 1FU). 
Neither the Jensen-Fenzl #1 nor the Page #2-20C5 Wells are 
drilled on lands believed to be owned by Bennion or in which 
Bennion owns an interest. (Affidavit of William J. Dwyer, at 
1112). Bennion has refused to lease or otherwise commit his 
mineral interest, if any, to the two wells drilled in Section 20. 
(Affidavit of William J. Dwyer, at 1113). Bennion has refused to 
pay a prorata share of the costs of drilling the wells. 
On July 30, 1985, Bennion filed a petition with the Board in 
Cause No. 13 9-47 for an order seeking an accounting and requiring 
payment of royalties and production payments affecting the 
Jensen-Fenzl #1 Well. The petition was amended on November 18, 
1985, to include the Page No. 2-20C5 Well. During the summer of 
1987, while the matter in Cause No. 139-47 was pending, Bennion 
brought an action in the United States District Court for the 
District of Idaho, for accounting complaints arising from the 
subject wells and lands. The action was dismissed in January 
1988 for lack of personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted. In June of 1988, 
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Bennion filed an identical suit in the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah. On February 22, 1990, the Utah 
District Court abstained from jurisdiction, and the complaint was 
dismissed without prejudice. The grounds for abstention were 
that the accounting proceeding in Cause No. 139-47 was pending 
before the Board. 
On May 10, 1990, Graham filed a motion to dismiss for 
failure to timely prosecute the accounting matter in Cause No. 
139-47. On May 24, 1990, Graham amended its motion to include 
motions to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action and for 
failure to join indispensable parties. By order dated July 31, 
1990, the Board dismissed Cause No. 139-47 for Bennion's failure 
to timely prosecute. (R. 37-39). The Board advised Bennion that 
it doubted seriously that it (the Board) had jurisdiction to 
entertain another accounting action absent a forced pooling order 
first being entered. (R. 37-38). 
On July 17, 1990, Bennion again petitioned the Board for 
Agency Action. (R. 1-6). Bennion requested, among other things, 
an accounting for the subject and subject wells with the Board of 
Oil, Gas and Mining. (R. 3). The Board pursuant to § 40-6-9(5) 
instructed the parties to meet to negotiate and investigate the 
issue. The parties met on August 16, 1990, at the Division of 
Oil, Gas and Mining to exchange relevant information and to 
attempt to resolve the issues involved in Bennion' s July 17, 1990 
Petition. At the meeting Bennion and Graham through their 
-7-
g:\wpn\110\00000z0f.W51 
representatives, attempted to negotiate a voluntary pooling 
arrangement. These negotiations proved unsuccessful. Between 
August 17, and August 31, the parties continued to attempt to 
negotiate an acceptable pooling agreement. 
At the August 16, 1991 meeting, the parties agreed to 
prepare and file pre-hearing issue statements identifying for the 
Board those issues that the parties believed were in dispute. 
Through the parties' prehearing issue statements, the parties set 
forth the central issue before the Board (Addendum "D"). The 
central issue was whether a pooling order, either voluntarily or 
involuntarily, was a prerequisite for Bennion to receive an 
accounting concerning the subject lands and subject wells. 
(TR. 27-28, R. 112, R. 30 and Addendum " D" ). Both parties stated in 
their pre-hearing issue statements that no voluntary or 
involuntary pooling order was in effect concerning the wells 
(R. 108-115, 28-32. and Addendum "D"). 
On September 10, 1989, Graham filed a Motion and Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities to dismiss Bennion' s request for agency 
action or in the alternative for summary judgment. (R. 82-99, 
Addendum " C"). On September 17th, Bennion objected to Graham's 
Motion to Dismiss and indicated the necessity of a Board 
determination concerning the pooling issue (R. 117-119). Two days 
before the Board hearing, Bennion filed a Motion to Continue, 
wherein he claimed that he had a scheduling conflict and further 
claimed that he was unclear concerning the issues to be presented 
-8-
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of the hearing, the Board heard Graham7 s Motion wherein Graham 
asserted that Bennion was not entitled to an accounting 
concerning the wells until a voluntarily or involuntarily pooling 
order was in effect for the subject lands and wells. (R. 185-192; 
TR. 37-39), Bennion objected to the Board hearing the Motion to 
Dismiss, and claimed that Graham was using "legal 
technicalities". (TR. 53). The Board noted that Bennion1 s Motion 
for Continuance was unwarranted because Bennion had ample 
knowledge of the issue before the Board and the date of the 
hearing. (TR. 13). The Board further stated that although 
Bennion had the opportunity to pursue his equitable share of the 
proceeds, Bennion must first obtain a pooling order which would 
determine Bennion's percentage mineral interest in the subject 
lands and wells and the applicable nonconsent penalties to be 
assessed against those interests. (R. 71-72). 
At the hearing, Bennion' s counsel proffered several exhibits 
to the Court as evidence. (TR. 44-45). The Board found the 
exhibits were not relevant to Graham1 s Motion which was the 
central issue before the Board. (TR. 46-47). Further, the Board 
held that the exhibits were not filed in a timely manner pursuant 
to regulations promulgated under Utah Administrative Code (1990). 
(TR. 46-47). The Board at a December 6, 1991 hearing allowed the 
exhibits to be included in the record, but refused to admit them 
as evidence. (TR. 28-29). 
-9-
g:\wpn\110\00000z0f.W51 
VI. SUMMARY QF ARGUMENTS 
The Utah Oil and Gas Board (the "Board") properly dismissed 
Bennion' s Request for Agency Action. The Utah Oil and Gas 
Conservation Action governs the relationships between 
nonconsenting owners of oil and gas interests and the operators 
of wells which are believed to effect those interests. Bennion' s 
request for an accounting and payment of proceeds based thereon 
was premature, since he had failed to meet a condition precedent 
for such accounting, that is, he had failed to force pool his 
interests, thereby identifying his percentage mineral interest in 
the subject lands and wells. Graham maintains that until a 
forced pooling order is entered identifying Bennion' s percentage 
mineral interest in the subject lands and wells and the 
nonconsent penalty to be assessed against said interest is 
established, Graham is unable to provide Mr. Bennion with an 
accounting or proceeds based thereon. 
The Board acted properly in dismissing Bennion' s Petition. 
Bennion presented no rebuttal affidavits, depositions, 
admissions, or other evidence required by Rule 56, and his 
pleadings did not rebut Graham' s material facts as they applied 
to issues raised in its Motion concerning the necessity of a 
forced pooling order. The Board acted properly in examining the 
evidence before it and ruling consistent therewith. 
-10-
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VII. ARGUMENTS 
A. BENNION IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE REQUESTED ACCOUNTING UNTIL 
SUCH TIME AS A POOLING ORDER IS ENTERED. 
Bennion is not entitled to an accounting pursuant to the 
Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act until a forced (involuntary) 
pooling order is entered for the subject lands and wells. Until 
such an accounting takes place, it is impossible for Graham to 
distribute to Bennion the proceeds which Graham admits he is 
entitled to. 
The Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act governs the 
relationships between nonconsenting owners of oil and gas 
interests, such as Bennion, and the operators of wells believed 
to affect those interests. The statute provides for, inter alia. 
the establishment of drilling units to ensure reasoned and 
rational production of oil and gas. See. Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-
6(1) (1988). Participation in the well on the drilling unit and 
the attendant right to an accounting results from either 
voluntary pooling, or forced-pooling, for common development of 
oil and gas interests in the drilling unit. See. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 40-6-6(5) (1988). 
Forced-pooling is a statutory procedure that pools all 
interests in the drilling unit owned by those, like Bennion, who 
refuse to voluntarily pool their interests. See. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 40-6-6(5)(1988). The rights and duties of the operator vis-a-
-11-
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vis owners of forced-pooled interests, including the right to an 
accounting, are defined by this statute, 
Bennion has refused to lease or otherwise voluntarily join 
in the drilling unit and/or participate in sharing the costs 
associated with the drilling and operations of the subject wells. 
Therefore, the Utah forced-pooling statute applies to the issues 
of this case. Bennion v. Utah State Board of Oil, Gas and 
Mining, 675 P. 2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1983). 
Bennion based his demand for an accounting on the Utah 
forced-pooling statute found in section 40-6-6(8) of the Utah 
Code Annotated. The accounting provisions of the forced-pooling 
statute are as follows: 
The operator of a well under a pooling order in which 
there are nonconsenting owners shall furnish the 
nonconsenting owners with monthly statements of all 
costs incurred, together with the quantity of oil or 
gas produced, and the amount of proceeds realized from 
the sale of this production during the preceding month. 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(8)(1988). (Emphasis added). 
There are conditions precedent to a nonconsenting owner such 
as Bennion receiving such an accounting. Those conditions are a 
(1) the formal spacing of the acreage into drilling units and (2) 
the forced-pooling of nonconsenting owners into the established 
drilling unit. Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-6-6(5),-6(8) (1988). £&£ 
also Swan & Hallock "The Comparison Contracts, and Effects of 
Compulsory Pooling Statutes," 28 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 911, 
922-23 (1982). Until these two conditions are met, no accounting 
is possible or required. 
-12-
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One of these conditions has been met, the subject lands have 
been formally spaced into drilling units. However, the second 
condition has not been met. Bennion has failed or refused to 
voluntarily or force pool his interest into the drilling unit 
and, as a result, Graham has no basis upon which to render an 
accounting and no basis upon which to pay Bennion any proceeds 
due him from production from the subject lands and wells. 
As a practical matter, Graham cannot formulate the 
arithmetic equation necessary to provide an accounting to Bennion 
until Bennion's percentage ownership for the subject lands and 
subject wells has been established and a determination made as to 
the nonconsent penalty anticipated in § 40-6-6, to be assessed 
against Bennion' s percentage ownership interest. Algebraic 
principles confirm that an equation with two unknowns is 
unsolvable. Without a sum certain for Bennion' s ownership 
interest and a sum certain for the nonconsent penalty to be 
applied against that interest, any accounting of funds offered by 
Graham would amount to little more than wild guess-work and 
speculation. Speculation of this type would undoubtedly motivate 
Bennion to seek monetary damages for an accounting he would 
characterize, at best as faulty, and at worst as fraudulent. The 
accounting requirement in Utah' s Oil and Gas Conservation Act 
should not be interpreted as Bennion suggests or in a way that 
would require Graham to subject itself to litigation by 
attempting to comply with the impossible. 
-13-
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A simple remedy was available to Bennion. This remedy was 
even recommended to him by the Board* Bennion should have forced 
pooled his interest in the subject lands and wells. Forced-
pooling would have established a sum certain as to his ownership 
interest and a sum certain as to the nonconsent penalty to be 
applied against that interest. With this information in hand, he 
would have been entitled to the accounting he seeks and Graham 
would have been in a position to produce both the accounting and 
the proceeds due under the forced pooling statute. 
Until Bennion establishes his ownership and the forced-
pooling order is entered, Graham is not able to, or obligated to, 
account to Bennion. Since there is no forced-pooling order, and, 
therefore, no entitlement to an accounting, Bennion' s petition 
was properly dismissed. 
B. THE BOARD' S ORDER ON GRAHAM' S MOTION WAS PROPER. 
The Board, as an administrative agency, is expressly 
authorized to dismiss actions under circumstances identified in 
Rule 56B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure § 63-46B-1(4)(b), 
Utah Code Ann., (1990). The only issue before the Board was 
Graham' s Motion concerning the necessity of a forced pooling 
order as a condition precedent to the accounting demanded by 
Bennion. The only pleadings before the Board and the only 
evidence before the Board was that provided by Graham. The Board 
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properly examined the evidence before it and ruled consistent 
with that evidence. 
The Board granted Graham' s Motion because there were no 
facts in dispute. Graham' s facts were squarely presented and 
were before the Board upon the Affidavit of William J. Dwyer and 
through facts maintained in the files of the Division of Oil, Gas 
and Mining of which the Board took judicial notice. The Dwyer 
affidavit was attached to Graham' s memorandum in support of its 
motions filed in this matter. 
Mr. Bennion' s pleadings did not rebut Graham' s material 
facts as they applied to the issues raised in Graham' s Motion. 
See Christensen v. Financial Serv. Co., 14 Utah 2d 101, 377 P. 2d 1010 
(1963). 
Bennion presented no rebuttal affidavits, depositions, 
admissions, or other evidence required by Rule 56 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure to place facts relevant to the motion 
for summary judgment in dispute. See Rule 56 (e). See also Franklin 
Fin. v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P. 2d 1040 (Utah 1983). 
Bennion' s shrill cry that the Board' s decision was unfair or 
prejudicial is unfounded. Bennion's late filed Motion for 
Continuance was rejected by the Board, as was his assertion that 
he was "unclear" as to the issue to be addressed at the September 
27, 1990 Board hearing. Bennion understood what was at issue, 
and even identified the issue in his Prehearing Issue Statement. 
Bennion chose not to respond to the Motion. Rather he appeared 
-15-
g:\wpn\110\00000z0f.W51 
and repeated the obvious, that he is entitled to a percentage 
share of the proceeds from the subject wells. This is a 
principle that Graham accepts and admits. 
Bennion, failed to provide any information or evidence to 
either Graham or the Board that would allow either the action to 
continue or an accounting to be provided. As noted above, 
without a sum certain as to Bennion' s ownership interest in the 
subject lands and wells and the nonconsent penalty that is to be 
assessed against his interest no accounting or payment was 
possible. Had he provided this information by way of Affidavit 
or through a responsive pleading to refute the Motion, the Board 
could have refused to grant the Motion or even ordered the relief 
originally requested. Without this information however, no 
relief could have been granted to Mr. Bennion by the Board. 
It is instructive to recall that the Board, on June 28, 
1990, when it dismissed Bennion7 s Cause No. 139-47, warned 
Bennion that it did not believe that it had jurisdiction to 
consider an accounting action absent a forced pooling order. 
Bennion ignored this counsel, pressed forward and, without 
providing the necessary information, demanded the impossible from 
Graham and the Board. The Board' s decision to grant Graham' s 
Motion recognized that Bennion' s request was unreasonable and was 
properly consistent with its earlier warning and the unrefuted 
evidence presented by Graham. 
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C. THE COURT SHOULD NOT DISTURB THE BOARD'S FINDINGS OF 
FACT BECAUSE THE RECORD SUPPORTS THOSE FINDINGS. 
This Court recently established standards to be utilized in 
the review of findings of fact and conclusions of law by the 
administrative agency. In First National Bank of Boston v. 
Country Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 799 P. 2d 1163 
(1990), the Court stated that the Administrative Procedures Act, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l to 22 (1989), requires the 
. . . appellate court to review the "whole record" 
to determine whether the agency's action is "supported 
by substantial evidence." "Substantial evidence" is 
that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is 
adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a 
conclusion. See Console* v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 
S. Ct. 1018, 1026-27, 16 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1966); Idaho State 
Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 715 P. 2d 927, 930-31 
(1985); Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, lis P. 2d 63, 68 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). An appellate court applying the 
"substantial evidence test" must consider both the 
evidence that supports the Tax Commission' s factual 
findings and the evidence that detracts from the 
findings. Nevertheless, the party challenging the 
findings—in this case, the taxpayer—must marshal all 
of the evidence supporting the findings and show that 
despite the supporting facts, the Tax Commission' s 
findings are not supported by substantial evidence. 
In reviewing the findings of the Board, the Court should not 
substitute its own conclusions it might have reached had it been 
the original trier of fact. In Grace Drilling v. Board of 
Review, 776 P. 2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the court said: 
In undertaking such a review, this court will not 
substitute its judgment as between two reasonably 
conflicting views, even though we may have come to a 
different conclusion had the case come before us for de 
novo review. [Citations omitted]. It is the province 
of the Board, not appellate courts, to resolve 
conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent inferences 
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can be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the 
Board to draw the inferences. 
D. THE COURT SHOULD GIVE DEFERENCE TO THE BOARD' S LEGAL 
CONCLUSIONS BASED ON ITS FINDINGS OF FACTS. 
1. Thg Bpfryfl' S SxpefftlSS ig Neeflgfl to M»H9 tfrg Fipfljpgg in 
t;hi§ q??3-
in First National B^QH Q$ Boston Vt Cwnty Bp»r<a 
Equalization of Salt Lake County, fijjpy», the Court recognized 
that the expertise of the administrative agencies must be 
considered by the appellate court. The expertise, however, must 
be applied in a manner consistent with the agency' s legislative 
mandate. 
Although it is a "universally recognized rule" 
that this court must "take some cognizance of the 
expertise of the agency in its particular field and 
accordingly to give some deference to its 
determi nation," Utah Power & Light Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 590 
P. 2d 332, 335 (Utah 1979), the agency's decision must 
rest upon some sound evidentiary basis, not a creation 
of fiat. 
Hyrley vT Bpfrrfl Q$ Review pf Inflystyifll Cpmm' r>, 767 P. 2d 524, 
526-27 (Utah 1988); Utah Power & Light, 590 P. 2d at 335; 799 P. 2d 
1163, 1166 [footnotes included]. 
The Utah State Legislature has empowered the Board under the 
forced pooling statute to establish drilling units and order an 
accounting when appropriate. In reaching its findings, the Board 
considered the evidence before it, and heard arguments of counsel 
from both parties. Based upon these factors, the Board dismissed 
Bennion' s request for an accounting because no accounting was 
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possible before a forced pooling order was entered. Its decision 
had a "sound evidentiary basis" and a proper and reasoned 
approach to the statutory scheme designed by the Legislature. 
Further in Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public 
Service Commission. 658 P. 2d 601 (Utah 1983), this court said: 
In reviewing decisions such as these, a court 
should afford great deference to the technical 
expertise or more extensive experience of the 
responsible agency. 
The members of the Board represent a broad range of 
interests and backgrounds. Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-4(2) provides: 
2. The board shall then consist of seven members 
appointed by the governor, which the advice and consent 
of the Senate. No more than four members shall be from 
the same political party. The members shall have the 
following qualifications: 
(a) two members knowledgeable in mining 
matters; 
(b) two members knowledgeable in oil 
and gas matters; 
(c) one member knowledgeable in 
ecological and environmental matters; 
(d) one member who is a private land 
owner, owns a mineral or royalty interest and 
is knowledgeable in those interests; and 
(e) one member who is knowledgeable in 
geological matters. 
Each of these individuals has been chosen to give the Board the 
necessary breadth of experience to review natural resource 
matters. Because of the experience of the Board and its 
understanding of the complexities of pooling orders and 
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accounting disputes, this Court should defer to the Board1 s 
findings and interpretation of the statute. 
2. The Bpfrrfl' ? L^g»l qonglytgiQn w^g Supports fry the 
Record as a Whole. 
In the case of Vt^h Department pf AflmjnigtyfrUve ggyyiggg vt 
Puftli? geyyig? Commission, SVP^a, the Court explained that 
factual questions sometimes lead to determinations of "special 
law", which, by their very nature, require the expertise of the 
agency empowered by the legislature to make such decisions. The 
Court in reviewing such findings of special laws, held that 
considerable weight should be given to such findings. That 
holding reads, as follows: 
Also among these intermediate issues are the 
Commission' s decisions on what can be called questions 
of "special law." These are the Commission's 
interpretations of the operative provisions of the 
statutory law it is empowered to administer, especially 
those generalized terms that bespeak a legislative 
intent to delegate their interpretation to the 
responsible agency. In reviewing agency decisions of 
this type, we apply what we have called the "time 
honored rule of law . . . that the construction of 
statutes by governmental agencies charged with their 
administration should be given considerable weight . . 
658 P. 2d 601, at page 610 (citing McPhie v. Industrial 
Commission, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1977); West Jordan v. 
Department of Employment Security. 656 P. 2d 411 (Utah 1982). 
Because of the extensive record in this matter, there was 
sufficient evidence to support the findings of fact and the 
conclusions of law contained in the Order of the Board, and the 
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Court should give "considerable weight" to the Board's 
interpretation of the Forced Pooling Statute. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This Court should uphold the Board' s decision dismissing 
Bennion' s Request for Agency Action. This Court' s should affirm 
the Board' s decision that in this case a forced pooling order is 
a condition precedent to Bennion' s request for accounting and his 
underlying request for proceeds from the subject lands and wells. 
DATED this S ^ day of August, 1991. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
BY. 
Attorneys for Graham Resources, Inc. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
(801) 532-3333 
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Thomas Mitchell, Esq. 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
40-6-6. Drilling units — Establishment — Pooling of inter-
ests — Order — Operation. 
(1) The Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, may order the establishment of 
drilling units covering any pool. All such orders shall be made upon terms and 
conditions that are just and reasonable. Drilling units shall be of uniform size 
and shape for the entire pool unless the board finds that it must make an 
exception due to geologic or geographic or other factors. When necessary the 
board may divide any pool into zones and establish drilling units for each 
zone, which units may differ in size and shape from those established in any 
other zone. The order shall include: 
(a) the acreage to be embraced within each drilling unit and the shape 
of each drilling unit as determined by the board but the unit shall not be 
smaller than the maximum area that can be efficiently and economically 
drained by one well; and 
(b) the direction that no more than one well shall be drilled for produc-
tion from the common source of supply on any drilling unit, and the 
authorized location of the well. 
(2) The board may modify the order to provide an exception to the autho-
rized location of the well when the board finds such a modification to be 
reasonably necessary. 
(3) An order establishing drilling units for a pool shall cover all lands 
determined by the board to be underlaid by the pool, and the order may be 
modified by the board to include additional areas determined to be underlaid 
by the pool. 
(4) After an order fixing drilling units has been entered by the board, the 
drilling of any well into the pool at a location other than authorized by the 
order, is prohibited. The operation of any well drilled in violation of an order 
fixing drilling units is prohibited. The board may modify the order to decrease 
or increase the size of the drilling units or permit additional wells to be drilled 
within the established units. 
(5) Two or more owners within a drilling unit may pool their interests for 
the development and operation of the unit. In the absence of voluntary pool-
ing, the board may enter an order pooling all interests in the drilling unit for 
the development and operation. The order shall be made upon terms and 
conditions that are just and reasonable. Operations incident to the drilling of 
a
 well upon any portion of a unit covered by a pooling order shall be deemed 
for all purposes to be the conduct of the operations upon each separately 
owned tract in the unit by the several owners. That portion of the production 
allocated or applicable to each tract included in a unit covered by a pooling 
order shall, when produced, be deemed for all purposes to have been produced 
from each tract by a well drilled thereon. 
(6) Each pooling order shall permit the drilling and operation of a well on 
the drilling unit by any owner within the drilling unit, and shall provide for 
the payment of the costs, including a reasonable charge for supervision and 
storage facilities, as provided in this subsection. 
In relation to each owner who refuses to agree to bear his proportionate 
share of the costs of the drilling and operation of the well (the nonconsenting 
owner), the order shall provide for reimbursement to the owner paying for the 
drilling and operation of the well (consenting owners) for the nonconsenting 
owner's share of the costs out of, and only out of, production from the unit 
attributable to his tract. The board is authorized to provide that the consent-
ing owners shall own and be entitled to receive all production from the well, 
applicable to each tract or interest, and obligations payable out of production, 
until the consenting owners have been paid the amount due under the terms 
of the pooling order or order relating to the drilling unit. In the event of any 
dispute as to such costs, the board shall determine the proper costs. The order 
shall provide that each consenting owner shall be entitled to receive, subject 
to royalty or similar obligations, the share of the production of the well appli-
cable to his interest in the unit, and, unless he has agreed otherwise, hig 
proportionate part of the nonconsenting owner's share of such production until 
costs are recovered as provided in this subsection; and that each nonconsent-
ing owner shall be entitled to receive, subject to royalty or similar obligations, 
the share of production from the well applicable to his interest in the unit 
after the consenting owners have recovered from the nonconsenting owner's 
share of production the following: 
(a) In respect to every such well 100% of the nonconsenting owner's 
share of the cost of surface equipment beyond the wellhead connections 
(including, but not limited to, stock tanks, separators, treaters, pumping 
equipment, and piping), plus 100% of the nonconsenting owner's share of 
the cost of operation of the well commencing with first production and 
continuing until the consenting owners have recovered these costs, it 
being intended that the nonconsenting owner's share of these costs and 
equipment will be that interest which would have been chargeable to the 
nonconsenting owner had he initially agreed to pay his share of the costs 
of the well from the beginning of the operation; and 
(b) An amount to be determined by the board but not less than 150% 
nor to exceed 200% of that portion of the costs and expenses of staking the 
location, wellsite preparation, rights-of-way, rigging up, drilling, rework-
ing, deepening or plugging back, testing, and completing, and the cost of 
equipment in the well (to and including the wellhead connections), after 
deducting any cash contributions received by the consenting owners. A 
reasonable interest charge may be included if the board finds it appropri-
ate. 
(7) The order shall provide that: 
(a) A nonconsenting owner of a tract in a drilling unit, which tract is 
subject to a lease or other contract for the development of oil and gas, 
shall have the costs provided in Subsection (6) paid from the production 
attributable to that tract. Any royalty interest or other interest not liable 
for the costs of production shall be paid by the nonconsenting owner and 
not from the production attributable to the tract until the consenting 
owners have recovered the costs as provided in Subsection (6). 
(b) A nonconsenting owner of a tract in a drilling unit, which is not 
subject to a lease or other contract for the development of oil and gas, 
shall receive as a royalty the average landowners royalty attributable to 
each tract within the drilling unit, determined prior to the commence-
ment of drilling and payable from the production allocated to each tract 
until the consenting owners have recovered the costs as provided in Sub-
section (6). 
(8) The operator of a well under a pooling order in which there are noncon-
senting owners shall furnish the nonconsenting owners with monthly state-
ments of all costs incurred, together with the quantity of oil or gas produced, 
and the amount of proceeds realized from the sale of this production during 
the preceding month. If and when the consenting owners recover from a non-
consenting owner's relinquished interest the amounts provided for in Subsec-
tion (6) of this section, the relinquished interest of the nonconsenting owner 
shall automatically revert to him; and the nonconsenting owner shall from 
that time own the same interest in the well and the production from it, and be 
liable for the further costs of the operation as if he had participated in the 
initial drilling and operation. These costs are payable out of production unless 
otherwise agreed between the nonconsenting owner and the operator. 
History: C. 1953, 404-6, enacted by L. 
40-6-9. Proceeds from sale of production — Payment of 
proceeds — Requirements — Proceeding on peti-
tion to determine cause of nonpayment — Reme-
dies — Penalties. 
(1) The oil and gas proceeds derived from the sale of production from any 
well producing oil, gas, or related hydrocarbons in the state shall be paid to all 
persons legally entitled to these payments commencing not later than 180 
days after the first day of the month following the date of first sale and 
thereafter not later than 30 days after the end of the calendar month within 
which payment is received by the payor for production unless other periods or 
arrangements are provided for in a valid contract with the person entitled to 
the proceeds. The payment shall be made directly to the person or persons 
entitled to the payment by the payor. The payment is considered to have been 
made upon deposit in the United States mail. 
(2) Payments shall be remitted to the person or persons entitled to proceeds 
from production annually for the aggregate of up to 12 months accumulation 
of proceeds if the total amount owed is $100 or less. 
(3) Any delay in determining any person legally entitled to an interest in 
the proceeds from production does not affect payments to all other persons 
entitled to payment. In instances where accrued payments cannot be made for 
any reason within the time limits specified in Subsection (2), the payor shall 
deposit all proceeds credited to the eventual oil and gas proceeds owner to an 
escrow account in a federally insured bank or savings and loan institution 
using a standard escrow document form which deposit shall earn interest at 
the highest rate being offered by that institution for the amount and term of 
such demand deposits. The escrow agent may commingle money received into 
escrow from any one lessee or operator, purchaser, or other party legally 
responsible for payment. Payment of principal and accrued interest from these 
accounts shall be paid by the escrow agent to all persons legally entitled to 
them within 30 days from the date of receipt by the escrow agent of final legal 
determination of entitlement to the payment. Applicable escrow fees shall be 
deducted from the payments. 
(4) Any party entitled to proceeds of production in oil and gas may file a 
petition with the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining to conduct a hearing to deter-
mine why these proceeds have not been paid. 
(5) Upon receipt of the petition the board shall set the matter for investiga-
tion and negotiation by the division within 60 days. 
(6) If the matter cannot be resolved by negotiation as of that date, the board 
may set a hearing within 30 days. If the board does not set a hearing, all 
information gathered during the investigation and negotiation shall be given 
to the petitioner who may then seek a remedy in the court system. 
(7) If, after a hearing, the board finds the payment of proceeds delay is 
without reasonable justification, it may order a complete accounting and re-
quire the proceeds and interest to be paid into an interest bearing escrow 
account and set a date not later than 90 days for final distribution. The board 
may also assess a penalty of up to 25% of the proceeds and interest at the rate 
of 1V2% per month from the date of delinquency until paid upon finding that 
the delay of payment of proceeds was known and intentional. 
(8) The penalty provisions of this chapter do not apply in the following 
instances: 
(a) the payor fails to make such payment otherwise required under this 
section in good faith reliance upon a title opinion by a licensed Utah 
attorney objecting to the lack of good and marketable title of record in the 
party claiming entitlement to payment and furnishes a copy of the opin-
ion to the party for necessary curative action; 
(b) the payor receives information which, in the payor's good faith judg-
ment, brings into question the entitlement of the person claiming the 
right to the payment to receive that payment or which has rendered 
unmarketable the title of the payment, or which may expose the payor to 
the risk of multiple liability or liability to third parties if the payment is 
made. In that event, the payor may suspend those payments otherwise 
required by this chapter or, at the request and expense of the party claim-
ing entitlement whereupon the payor's own initiative, may interplead 
such fund in the manner provided by law in order to resolve such claims 
and avoid liability under this chapter; 
(c) the total amount of oil and gas proceeds in possession of the payor 
owed to the owner thereof making claim to payment is less than $100 at 
the end of any month; or 
(d) the party entitled to payment has failed or refused to execute a 
division or transfer order acknowledging the proper interest to which the 
party claims to be entitled and setting forth the mailing address to which 
payment may be directed. 
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ADDENDUM "B" 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING 
00O00 
IN THE MATTER OF SAM H. BENNION 
FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING GRAHAM 
RESOURCES, INC. TO PAY ROYALTY 
AND PRODUCTION PAYMENTS ON THE 
JENSEN-FENZL NO. 1 WELL 1-20C5, 
SECTION 20, TOWNSHIP 3 SOUTH, 
RANGE 5 WEST, DUCHESNE COUNTY, 
UTAH, AND THE PAGE 2-20C5 
WELL, SECTION 20, TOWNSHIP 3 
SOUTH, RANGE 5 WEST, DUCHESNE 
COUNTY, UTAH 
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
DOCKET NO. 90-034 
CAUSE NO. 139-66 
ooOoo 
Pursuant to the Request for Agency Action of Sam H. Bennion 
("Bennion"), this cause came before the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, 
Department of Natural Resources, on Thursday, September 27, 1990, 
commencing at the hour of 10:35 a.m. in the boardroom of the Division 
of Oil, Gas and Mining, 3 Triad Center, Suite 301, 355 West North 
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
At the hearing of September 27, 1990, argument of the parties was 
heard. The following Board members were present at the hearing: 
James W. Carter, Acting Chairman 
John M. Garr 
Richard B. Larsen 
E. Steele Mclntyre 
Kent G. Stringham 
Chairman Gregory P. Williams recused himself from this 
hearing. 
The Board was represented by Thomas A. Mitchell, Esq., Assistant 
Attorney General for the State of Utah. 
Appearances for the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining ("Division") 
were made by Dr. Dianne R. Nielson, Director; Ronald J. Firth, 
Associate Director, Oil and Gas; John R. Baza, Petroleum Engineer; 
and Brad Hill, Petroleum Geologist. 
Bennion was represented by Peter Stirba, Esq. and Barbara 
Zimmerman, Esq. 
Graham Resources, Inc. ("Graham") was represented by Phillip Wm. 
Lear, Esq. and Danielle M. Ferron, Esq. 
NOW THEREFORE, the Board, having considered the testimony 
adduced, the exhibits received in evidence, and the pleadings of the 
parties and being fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Due and regular notice of the time, place and purpose of the 
September 27, 1990, hearing was given to all interested parties as 
required by law and the rules and regulations of the Board. 
2. The Board has jurisdiction over the subject matter, of the 
Request for Agency Action and over all the parties interested therein 
and has jurisdiction to make and promulgate the Order hereinafter set 
forth. 
3. Pursuant to Section 40-6-9, Utah Code Annotated, (1988), 
Bennion has requested that the Board conduct an investigation and 
negotiation and that if unsuccessful, the Board order a hearing to 
determine why proceeds have not been paid to Bennion from the 
Jensen-Fenzl No. 1 Well, 1-20C5, Section 20, Township 3 South, Range 
5 West and the Page 2-20C5 Well, Section 20, Township 3 South, Range 
5 West, Duchesne County, State of Utah ("the Wells"). 
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4. Bennion's Request for Agency Action, sought relief as 
follows: 
a. That the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining initiate an 
investigation of the facts of this matter so that 
negotiations can take place as required by § 40-6-9(4) 
and (5), Utah Code Ann., (1988); 
b. that should negotiations be unsuccessful, the Board 
order a hearing as required by § 40-6-9(6), Utah Code 
Ann., (1988); 
c. that the Board order Graham to make an accounting to 
Bennion for all oil, gas and natural gas liquids 
produced from the wells; 
d. that the Board order Graham to pay Bennion all 
royalties and working interests not presently paid to 
Bennion for his share of oil, gas and natural gas 
liquids in the wells; 
e. that the Board find that Graham's delay of payments 
from the wells were knowing and intentional and without 
reasonable justification; 
f. that the Board assess a penalty to Graham of 
twenty-five percent of the payments owed Bennion and 
interest to the rate of 1.5% per month from the date of 
delinquency until paid; 
g. that the Board order that Bennion not be required to 
pay his share of costs of drilling of the Page 2-20C5 
well; and 
h. that the Board grant an award of attorney's fees and 
costs and such other relief as the Board found 
appropriate. 
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5. Graham filed a response to the Request for Agency Action on 
August 10, 1990, which asserted the affirmative defenses of the 
applicable statute of limitation, equitable doctrine of laches, 
equitable doctrine of estoppel, equitable doctrine of waiver, failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and failure to 
name an indispensable party. Graham requested relief from the Board 
as follows: 
a. Dismissal of Bennion's Request for Agency Action with 
prejudice; 
b. in the alternative, that the matter be set for informal 
hearing; 
c. that Bennion's request for a penalty, interest and 
attorney's fees be dismissed; and 
d. that Graham be awarded reasonable attorney's fees, 
costs and such other relief as the Board deems 
appropriate. 
6. On August 16, 1990, counsel for the Petitioner, Barbara 
Zimmerman, and for the Respondent, Phillip Wm. Lear, appeared before 
Ronald J. Firth and Thomas A. Mitchell, Esq. for investigation and 
negotiation. At that time the parties exchanged information relevant 
to this matter. Graham's counsel took the position that in the 
absence of a voluntary or involuntary pooling order, Graham would not 
account to or make payments of proceeds to Bennion. However, the 
parties agreed to attempt to negotiate a voluntary pooling 
agreement. The parties also agreed to file Pre-hearing Issue 
Statements prior to the Board hearing of September 27, 1990, setting 
forth those issues of fact and law that might remain in dispute 
subsequent to the parties negotiations. The parties were unable to 
negotiate a voluntary pooling agreement or otherwise settle their 
dispute. The parties did prepare and file Pre-hearing Issue 
Statements prior to the September 27 hearing. On September 10, 1989, 
Graham filed a Motion and Memorandum of Points and Authorities to 
Dismiss Petitioner's Request for Agency Action or in the Alternative 
for Summary Judgment. 
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7. On September 25, 1990, Bennion filed a Motion to Continue on 
the basis that Bennion had a scheduling conflict with regard to his 
company's annual operational meeting in Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that 
Bennion's counsel had received no response from the Board to his 
letter of September 17, 1990, concerning what the Board would hear 
and argue at the hearing of September 27. Bennion filed no 
memorandum in opposition to Graham's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary 
Judgment. 
8. Both parties stipulate in their Pre-hearing Issue Statements 
that no pooling order, either voluntary or involuntary is in effect 
concerning the wells. Both parties also set forth as a central issue 
to be resolved at the hearing, the question of whether or not a 
pooling order is a pre-requisite to Bennion receiving proceeds from 
the wells. 
9. The Board finds that the Motion to Dismiss or in the 
alternative for Summary Judgment filed by Graham is properly before 
the Board. The Board also finds that the issue of whether or not a 
pooling order, voluntary or involuntary, is a pre-requisite for 
receiving an accounting under § 40-6-9(7), Utah Code Ann., (1988), is 
properly addressed at this time. 
10. The Board finds no basis for continuing this matter, in that 
Bennion has known at all relevant times of the date of the hearing, 
and that Bennion's counsel has been afforded adequate time in which 
to respond to the issue concerning the necessity of a pooling order 
for the relief requested under § 40-6-9(7), Utah Code Ann., (1988). 
11. The Board finds that the wells are located in a drilling 
unit established for common development of the entire lands 
comprising Section 20, Township 3 South, Range 5 West, USM, Duchesne 
County, Utah. 
12. The Board finds that when the drilling unit was established, 
Bennion was the owner of mineral interests in the spaced area which 
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ownership gives rise to correlative rights. By virtue of these 
correlative rights he is endowed with the opportunity to obtain his 
just and equitable share of the oil and gas from the pool which 
underlies the spaced area. The Board finds, based upon the 
undisputed evidence, that Bennion owns an undivided mineral interest 
in the north half of Section 20, Township 3 South, Range 5 West, 
USM., Duchesne County, Utah. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Pursuant to § 40-6-9(4), Utah Code Ann., (1988), Bennion is 
entitled to file a Request for Agency Action with the Board to 
conduct a hearing to determine why proceeds to which he alleges he is 
entitled have not been paid. 
2. Pursuant to § 40-6-9(5), Utah Code Ann., (1988), Bennion is 
entitled to have the Division conduct an investigation and 
negotiation as to why proceeds from the wells have not been paid. 
3. Where the matter cannot be resolved by negotiation, Bennion 
is entitled, pursuant to § 40-6-9(6) & (7), Utah Code Ann., (1988), 
to have the Board set a hearing to determine if the delay in payment 
of proceeds is without reasonable justification. 
4. The Board concludes that Graham is not required to furnish 
nonconsenting interest owners with monthly statements of costs 
incurred, evidence of the quantity of oil or gas produced or the 
amount of proceeds in the absence of voluntary or involuntary 
pooling. The Board finds a pooling agreement or order to be a 
condition precedent to Graham's obligation to provide such an 
accounting or payment of proceeds. 
5. The Board concludes that Bennion is not legally entitled, 
within the meaning at § 40-6-9(1) or (4), Utah Code Ann., (1989), to 
payment of proceeds, inasmuch as there is no pooling in effect. 
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6. The Board concludes that it cannot determine the amount of 
proceeds which may be payable to Bennion, even where the extent of 
his mineral interest is known, until and as part of a pooling order, 
the amounts set forth in § 40-6-6(6), Utah Code Ann., (1988), are 
determined. 
7. The Board concludes that the delay in payment of proceeds to 
Bennion is with reasonable justification. Therefore, the Board 
concludes that it may not order a complete accounting or order 
penalties as provided under § 40-6-9(6) & (7), Utah Code Ann., (1988). 
8. In order to obtain the relief Petitioner seeks, he must 
exercise his statutory remedies by petitioning the Board for a forced 
pooling order under § 40-6-6, Utah Code Ann., (1988), or enter into a 
voluntary pooling agreement. 
9. The Board concludes that Bennion has failed to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted as to the prayers set forth in 
the Findings of Fact at paragraphs, 4.c. thru 4.h. Rule 12(B)(6) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that where, on a Motion to 
Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, matters outside the pleadings are presented and not excluded 
by the forum, the motion is to be treated as a Motion for Summary 
Judgment under Rule 56, U.R.C.P. 
10. The Utah Administrative Procedures Act expressly authorizes 
the Board, as an administrative agency, to dismiss actions under the 
circumstances identified in Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, § 63-46B-l(4)(b), Utah Code Ann., (1990). 
11. The Board concludes that Graham's Motion for Summary 
Judgment should be granted, dismissing with prejudice Bennion*s 
requests for relief set forth in the Findings of Fact at paragraphs, 
4.c. thru 4.h. 
-7-
12. The relief ordered by the Board in this matter will prevent 
the drilling of unnecessary wells, prevent waste, and protect 
correlative rights. 
Substantial evidence now being available and considered by the 
Board upon which to reach its decision, the Board issues the 
following: 
QEDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. Petitioner's Request for Agency Action as referenced in the 
Findings of Fact, paragraphs 4.a. and 4.b is granted. 
2. The Board denies the Petitioner's Request for Agency Action 
as referenced in Findings of Fact, paragraphs 4.c. thru 4.h. These 
requests are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Respondent Graham's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
3. Petitioner Bennion's Motion for Continuance is denied. 
4. The Board retains exclusive continuing jurisdiction over all 
matters covered by this Order and over all the parties affected 
thereby, and particularly reserves exclusive and continuing 
jurisdiction to make further orders as appropriate and as authorized 
by statute and regulation. 
DATED t h i s rfw of Oe tf\UMS-t 199X1 
STATE OF UTAH 
DIVISION OF OIL, GAS AND MINING 
vSfcr 
James W. Carter 
Acting Chairman 
APPSNPVM "C" 
ADDENDUM MC 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF SAM H. ] 
BENNION FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING] 
GRAHAM RESOURCES, INC. TO ] 
PAY ROYALTY AND PRODUCTION ] 
PAYMENTS ON THE JENSEN-FENZL ] 
#1 WELL 1-20C5, SECTION 20, ] 
TOWNSHIP 3 SOUTH, RANGE 5 
WEST, DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH, 
AND THE PAGE #2-20C5 WELL, 
SECTION 20, TOWNSHIP 3 SOUTH, ] 
RANGE 5 WEST, DUCHESNE 
COUNTY, UTAH. 
i MOTION TO DISMISS 
i OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
i MOTION FOR 
i SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
i Docket No. 90-034 
i Cause No. 139-66 
Graham Resources, Inc. ("Graham"), by and through its attorney 
of record, herewith moves the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining to 
dismiss this matter for failure to state a cause of action for 
which relief can be granted and for failure to name indispensable 
parties; or, in the alternative, moves the Board for summary 
judgment. These motions are made pursuant to R619-100-500 of the 
Rules and Procedure Before the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, 3 Utah 
Admin. Code (1990), and pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(7) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as to the motion to dismiss, and 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as to the motion for 
Respondent seeks dismissal/summary judgment with prejudice and 
on the merits. 
DATED this 10th day of September, 1990. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
By (^^iul^ fat, Q^L^y 
PhXllip (torn. Lear'' .H
Danielle M. Ferron 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Graham Resources, Inc. 
50 South Main Street, P. 0. Box 45340 
Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Address of Respondent: 
Graham Resources, Inc. 
109 Northpark Boulevard 
P. 0. Box 3134 
Covington, Louisiana 70434-3134 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of 
the within and foregoing Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, 
Motion for Summary Judgment to be mailed, postage prepaid, this 
10th day of September, 1990, to the following: 
Peter Stirba, Esq. 
Barbara Zimmerman, Esq. 
McKay, Burton & Thurman 
Suite 1200 
Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
M. Denise Wathen 
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ADDENDUM " D" 
ADDENDUM "D" 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS & MINING 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, STATE OF UTAH 
PRE-HEARING ISSUE 
STATEMENT 
IN THE MATTER OF SAM H. BENNION 
FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING GRAHAM 
RESOURCES, INC., TO PAY ROYALTY 
AND PRODUCTION PAYMENTS ON THE 
JENSEN-FENZL #1 WELL, 1-20C5, 
SECTION 20, TOWNSHIP 3 SOUTH, 
RANGE 5 WEST, AND THE PAGE 
2-20C5 WELL, SECTION 20, 
TOWNSHIP 3 SOUTH, RANGE 5 WEST, 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH. Docket No. 90-034 
Cause No. 139-66 
This matter having come before the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining on August 16, 
1990, at an investigation and negotiation conference held before two members of the 
Board, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 40-6-9(5) (1989); Barbara Zimmerman having 
appeared as counsel for Petitioner, Sam H. Bennion, and Phil Lear having appeared as 
counsel for Respondent, Graham Resources, Inc., the following issues have been reserved 
for hearing before the Board: 
1. General Nature of the Claims of the Petitioner 
(a) Petitioner's Claims: Petitioner is a nonconsenting interest owner of 
oil and gas royalties in the following wells in Duchesne County, State of Utah: Jensen-
Fenzl #1 Well, and the Page 2-20C5 Well. 
(b) Graham Resources, Inc. is the operator of the aforementioned wells. 
(c) That Graham Resources, Inc. has suspended payment to Mr. Bennion 
of royalty payments or production payments regarding the aforementioned wells. 
2. Uncontroverted Facts 
(a) On or about July 17, 1990, Petitioner, Sam H. Bennion, filed his 
Petition with the Board seeking payment of royalty and production proceeds from two 
oil and gas wells operated by Graham. 
(b) Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 40-6-9(5) (1989), the Petition 
was set for investigation and negotiation by the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining on 
August 16, 1990. 
(c) During the negotiation and investigation conference, counsel for 
Petitioner inquired of the Respondent's counsel why Mr. Bennion has not been paid with 
regard to his interest in some of the wells that Graham operates. Counsel for 
Respondent indicated that Mr. Bennion was not being paid the royalty interest or 
production payments due to the fact that the wells had not been pooled under a 
voluntary or involuntary pooling agreement. In response to this, Petitioner's counsel 
suggested that, in order for Mr. Bennion to receive the payments he is entitled to, the 
parties attempt to stipulate to a pooling order pooling the unit on which the wells have 
been drilled. 
(d) Counsel for the Division, Thomas A. Mitchell, requested of both 
parties that negotiations continue and that, if possible, a written stipulation be entered 
into establishing the pooling of the units. Counsel for the Board also requested that 
counsel for both parties meet on August 31, 1990 to discuss the pooling order and any 
other issues to be reserved for the hearing. The Board also asked that both parties 
prepare a "pre-trial order" by September 5, 1990, indicating what matters had been 
resolved by negotiation and indicating any issues are reserved to be heard by the Board. 
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(e) Mr. Bennion has made a good faith attempt to negotiate with 
Graham by and through his attorneys. Counsel for Mr. Bennion has prepared and 
drafted a Stipulation and Order for the pooling of the units operated by Graham and 
has delivered this to Graham's counsel in a timely manner. Counsel for Mr. Bennion 
has discussed modifications with Mr. Lear by telephone in lieu of a meeting on August 
31 as the Board required. A modified stipulation was hand-delivered to Mr. Lear on 
August 31, changing the stipulation to comply with Mr. Lear's suggestions. After no 
response to the modified stipulation was received by Mr. Lear, his office was contacted 
on September 5 and a message was left with Mr. Lear's secretary to contact us with an 
answer as to whether Graham intended to enter into the stipulation. 
(f) Mr. Lear's office left word with Mr. Stirba's office on September 5 
stating that Graham would not be signing the stipulation and, therefore, the issues would 
not be resolved prior to the September 5th deadline. 
(g) Therefore, all issues in the Petition must be resolved by the Board. 
3. Contested Issues to be Resolved The contested issues which remain 
to be resolved by the Board at hearing in September of 1990 are as follows: 
(a) Mr. Bennion's interest in the wells operated by Graham Resources, 
Inc. 
(b) What is owing to Mr. Bennion from Graham Resources, Inc. in 
royalty payments and production payments. 
(c) Whether or not a pooling order is required (either voluntary or 
involuntary) in order for Mr. Bennion to receive what is owed him. 
(d) Whether or not Mr. Bennion is required to sign a Division Order 
prior to his receipt of payment. 
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(e) The total costs for drilling and operation of the wells. 
(f) Whether or not a nonconsent penalty should be applied to the unit 
operated by Graham Resources, Inc. and if so, what amount of penalty should be 
assessed. 
(g) Whether or not Mr. Bennion is entitled to his share of the oil and 
gas in kind. 
(h) The total amounts of n.g.l.s produced by the wells operated by 
Graham and determination of payment to Mr. Bennion. 
4. Settlement 
As a result of the negotiations which have taken place thus far in this 
matter, counsel for the Petitioner, Sam H. Bennion, considers the possibility of settlement 
poor. 
Therefore, Petitioner asks that the above-mentioned issues be resolved by the 
Board at hearing on September 27, 1990. 
DATED this (^ day of September, 1990. 
McKAY, ByRTOIl^&JILURMAN 
IRBJ 
BARBARA ZI&MERMAN 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Attorneys for Petitioner, 
Sam H. Bennion 
Petitioner's Address: 
Sam H. Bennion 
1800 North Holmes Avenue 
Idaho Falls, ID 83401 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the t o day of September, 1990, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing PRE-HEARING ISSUE STATEMENT was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Phillip Wm. Lear 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Post Office Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
jb\barb\pl\bcnn-gra.ord 
5 
rP>15©5STO)|[i 
4k »H 
'
S:&
 SEP 17 1990 ^ 
0»v?Sfi>\' OF 
BBPORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MININGS & MINING 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF SAM H. 
BENNION FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING 
GRAHAM RESOURCES, INC. TO PAT 
ROYALTY AND PRODUCTION 
PAYMENTS ON THE JENSEN-FENZL 
#1 WELL 1-20C5, SECTION 20, 
TOWNSHIP 3 SOUTH, RANGE 5 
WEST, DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH, 
AND THE PAGE #2-20C5 WELL, 
SECTION 20, TOWNSHIP 3 SOUTH, 
RANGE 5 WEST, DUCHESNE COUNTY, 
UTAH. 
RESPONDENT'S PRE-HEARING 
ISSUES STATEMENT 
Docket No. 90-034 
Cause No. 139-66 
This matter was presented before the Division of Oil, Gas 
and Mining ("Division") on August 16, 1990, for investigation and 
negotiation pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 40-6-9 (Supp. 1990). 
Barbara Zimmerman appeared on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Sam H. 
Bennion ("Bennion"). Phillip Wm. Lear appeared on behalf of the 
respondent, Graham Resources, Inc. ("Graham"). The Division was 
present through Ronald J. Firth, Associate Director for Oil and 
Gas, and through its counsel, Thomas A. Mitchell. 
Subsequent to the conference, the parties attempted to 
further negotiate and narrow the range of issues requiring 
resolution before the Board. The parties were unsuccessful. 
Due to the lack of success in negotiating a stipulated 
settlement, Graham filed its motions to dismiss and for summary 
judgment on September 10, 1990, seeking either dismissal with 
prejudice on the merits or summary judgment. The hearing on the 
motion is scheduled for September 27, 1990. 
This Respondent's Pre-Hearing Issues Statement sets forth 
those issues that are reserved for the Board in the event that 
Graham's motions for dismissal or summary judgment are denied. The 
issues are as follows: 
1. Jurisdiction. This is an action for an accounting 
and payment of proceeds of production from oil and gas wells. 
Jurisdiction is properly invoked pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 40-6-
9 (1988). The jurisdiction is not disputed by the parties. 
2. General Nature of Bennion's Claims. 
a. Bennion claims to be a nonconsenting owner in 
the Jensen-Fenzl # 1 Well and the Page #2-20C5 Well located in 
Section 20 of Township 2 South, Range 5 West, U.S.M., in Duchesne 
County, Utah. (Said wells are collectively referred to herein as 
the "Wells"). 
b. Bennion claims to be entitled to oil and gas 
royalties from the Wells. 
c. Bennion claims to own a 0.0035436% mineral 
interest in the Wells. 
d. Bennion claims that Graham is the operator of 
the Wells* 
e. Bennion claims that Graham has failed to 
provide monthly accounting materials to him based upon production 
from the Wells. 
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f . Bennion claims that Graham has withheld payment 
of proceeds of production from the Wells attributable to him. 
g. Bennion claims that the Page # 2-20C5 Well was 
not properly designated as a production well as required by the 
version of Utah Code Ann. S 40-6-6(8) in effect when the well was 
permitted and drilled. 
h. Bennion claims that he is not obligated to pay 
his pro rata share of the costs of drilling the Page # 2-20C5 Well, 
because that well was designated as a production well without 
hearing to the Board. 
3. Remedies Sought bv Bennion. 
a. Graham make a full accounting of all oil, gas, 
and natural gas liquids produced from the Wells. 
b. Graham pay all amounts of royalties and working 
interests not presently paid for Bennion's share of oil, gas, and 
natural gas liquids from the Wells. 
c. The Board enter findings that Graham's failure 
to pay was known and intentional. 
d. The Board assess a penalty to Graham of 25% of 
the payments owed to Bennion and interest at the rate of 1.5% per 
month from the date of delinquency until paid. 
e. The Board hold that Bennion is not required to 
pay his share of the costs of drilling the Page # 2-20C5 Well. 
f. The Board award Bennion attorney's fees and 
costs. 
g:\wpn\050\00000dk4.W51 
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4. General Nature of Graham's Response. 
a. Graham does not operate the Wells. 
b. Bennion's mineral ownership is limited 
exclusively to lands in the North half of Section 20. 
c. Neither well is drilled on lands in which 
Bennion has an interest. 
d. The lands in which Bennion has an interest have 
not been voluntarily or involuntarily (forced-pooled) into the 
drilling unit established for Section 20 and the Wells. 
e. Forced-pooling is a condition precedent to 
Bennion being entitled an accounting and payment of proceeds from 
the Wells. 
f. Execution of a division order is a condition 
precedent to Bennion receiving proceeds from the Wells. 
g. Graham's affiliates or subsidiaries have 
operated the Wells only since April 1984. 
h. Graham or its affiliates or subsidiaries have 
provided Bennion's counsel with accounting materials on three 
occasions since 1986. 
i. Graham or its affiliates have been responsible 
for distributing proceeds of gas production only since that April 
1984. 
j. Third parties not named in this action are, and 
for years have been, responsible for distribution of proceeds from 
oil. 
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k. Bennion has failed to name indispensable 
parties. 
1. Bennion has failed to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted* 
m. This action is time-barred either in whole or 
in part by the statute of limitation contained in Utah Code Ann. S 
40-6-9 (1988). 
n. This action is barred by the equitable 
doctrines of waiver or estoppel. 
5. Remedies Sought bv Graham. 
a. Dismissal of this matter with prejudice and on 
the merits for failure to state a cause of action for which relief 
can be granted. 
b. Dismissal of this matter with prejudice and on 
the merits for failure to name indispensable parties. 
c. Dismissal of this matter with prejudice because 
this action is time-barred in whole or in part by applicable 
statute of limitation. 
d. Dismissal of this matter because this action is 
barred by the equitable doctrines of waiver and estoppel. 
e. Entry of an order for summary judgment on 
grounds that the statutory prerequisites for an accounting and 
payment of proceeds of production have not been met. 
f. Award to Graham attorney's fees, costs, and any 
other relief deemed appropriate by the Board. 
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6. Dncontroverted Facts, Respondent accepts Bennion's 
version of the uncontroverted facts as stated, but further 
supplements those facts as follows: 
a. At the August 16, 1990, investigation and 
negotiation conference, counsel for the Division requested that the 
parties attempt to resolve their differences and identified 
uncontroverted and controverted facts beyond the tentative 
agreements made at that conference. 
b. By letter dated August 17, 1990, Graham's 
counsel submitted a list of possible points of agreement and 
stipulation to Bennion's counsel. Graham's counsel requested of 
Bennion's counsel to identify those areas of possible stipulation 
and those points that necessarily would need to be reserved for the 
Board. The August 17, 1990 letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"A." 
c. Bennion's counsel responded as set forth in 
Bennion's version of the Pre-Hearing Issues Statement, but 
Bennion's response was unacceptable to Graham. 
d. No accommodation could be reached. 
Consequently, all issues are reserved to the Board. 
e. The Board entered its Order in Cause No. 139-4X 
authorizing two wells for production from the drilling units in the 
Altamont-Bluebell Field of which these lands a part. 
7. Contested Issues of Fact. 
a. Quantum of interest owned by Bennion in the 
drilling unit, expressed in a percentage of the total mineral 
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estate owned in the tract of land in which he has an undivided 
interest and then as a percentage of the drilling unit comprising 
Section 20. 
b. Bennion's interest has not been pooled into the 
drilling unit and Wells either voluntarily or involuntarily. 
c. Total cost of drilling and reworking the 
Jensen-Fenzl #1 Well. 
d. Total cost of operating the Jensen-Fenzl #1 
Well. 
e. Sufficient evidence justified the drilling of 
the Page # 2-20C5 Well as a test well. 
f. The total cost of drilling the Page #2-20C5 
Well. 
g. The total cost of operating the Page #2-20C5 
Well. 
h. Quantum of forced pooling penalty for the 
Jensen-Fenzl #1 Well. 
i. Quantum of Forced pooling penalty for the Page 
#2-20C5 Well. 
j. Amounts heretofore paid to Bennion to date for 
the Jensen-Fenzl # 1 Well. 
k. Amounts heretofore paid to Bennion to date for 
the Page # 2-20C5 Well. 
1. Nature of future payments to be paid to 
Bennion, if any, whether to be made in proceeds of production or 
in-kind. 
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8. Contested Issues of Law, 
a. Whether the entry of a forced-pooling order is 
a condition precedent to an accounting and payment of proceeds of 
production to "nonconsenting owner," 
b. Whether the execution of a division order is a 
condition precedent to the payment of proceeds of production. 
c. Whether the Page # 2-20C5 Well was properly 
authorized and drilled. 
d. Whether the Board's Order in Cause No, 139-42, 
legitimized test wells theretofore drilled in the Greater Altamont-
Bluebell Field. 
e. Whether Bennion's interest is properly forced 
pooled into the Page #2-20C5 Well. 
f. Whether Bennion is entitled to receive future 
payment, if any, in kind, 
g. Whether Graham is entitled to attorney's fees 
and costs in this matter. 
DATED this 15th day of September, 1990. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Bv £^%^ C ^ ( ^ W 
Phillip m. Lear/ 
Danielle M. Ferron 
Attorneys for the Respondent 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of 
the within and foregoing Respondent's Pre-Hearing Issues Statement 
to be mailed by First Class Postage, United States Mail, this 15th 
day of September, 1990, to the following: 
Peter Stirba, Esq. 
McKay, Burton & Thurman 
Suite 1200 
Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Barbara Zimmerman, Esq. 
McKay, Burton & Thurman 
Suite 1200 
Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Thomas A. Mitchell, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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August 17, 1990 
Peter Stirba, Esq. 
McKay, Burton & Thurman 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Re: Sam H. Bennion 
Accounting Proceedings 
Docket No. 90-034 
Cause No. 139-66 
SEP 25 1990 )V 
OIV'SIGM OF 
ML GAS 4 MINING 
Dear Peter: 
During the course of yesterday's negotiation conference 
initiated by the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining, Tom Mitchell 
encouraged the parties to stipulate to what issues they could in 
an effort to settle this matter short of a protracted Board 
hearing. Barbara Zimmerman and I were able to identify several 
areas of possible agreement, but neither of us had authority from 
our clients to stipulate. 
Consequently, I am proposing the following list of 
possible areas of stipulation to which I request that you respond 
at your earliest convenience: 
a. Quantum of interest owned by Mr. Bennion in the 
drilling unit, expressed in a percentage of the 
total mineral estate owned in the tract of land in 
which he has an undivided interest and then as a 
percentage of the drilling unit comprising Section 
20. 
b. The total cost of drilling and reworking the 
Jensen-Fenzl #1 Well. 
c. The total cost of operating the Jensen-Fenzl #1 
Well. 
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d. The total cost of drilling the Page #2-20C5 Well, 
m. The total cost of operating the Page #2-20C5 Well. 
f. Stipulation to the act of forced pooling. 
g. Quantum of risk-penalty (nonconsent or forced 
pooling penalty) for the Jensen-Fenzl #l Well. 
h. Page #2-20C5 is an authorized well. 
i. Mr. Bennion's interest is properly forced pooled 
into the Page #2-20C5 Well. 
j. Quantum of forced pooling penalty for the Jensen-
Fenzl #1 Well. 
k. Quantum of Forced pooling penalty for the Page #2-
20C5 Well. 
1. Graham has not waived its right, or is not 
estopped from asserting, the legal position that 
spacing and forced pooling are conditions 
precedent to a nonconsenting owner being entitled 
to receive payments and accounting, by virtue of 
Graham having tendered accounting information 
prior to the date of any forced pooling hearing. 
m. Prior to receiving further payments; Mr. Bennion 
will sign a division order containing among other 
standard language, acceptable warranty language, 
or in lieu thereof will sign a division order from 
which warranty language is deleted if he provides 
to Graham Energy, Ltd. a title opinion prepared by 
a recognized Utah title attorney acceptable to 
Graham, confirming his ownership in the drilling 
unit from the date of first production from the 
Jensen-Fenzl #1 Well to current date. 
The foregoing are proposed areas of stipulation only. 
I am submitting this list simultaneously to Graham for its 
consideration. I have no authority to bind Graham to the 
foregoing or to represent that the foregoing comprises the entire 
list of possible areas of agreement. This list should be is for 
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purposes of commencing discussions in the hopes of settling this 
matter. 
Please identify those elements to which Mr. Bennion 
will stipulate and those which must be reserved for Board 
determination. To the extent that you have other suggested areas 
of stipulation, please include them in your response. 
Time is of the essence. We have until August 31, 1990, 
to come to agreement and to prepare for the Board's review a 
pretrial order. I look forward to hearing from you. 
Very truly yours, 
Phillip Wm. Lear 
cc: Raymond Roush, Esq. 
William Aspinwall 
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